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In the 1980 Presidential election, all three major television net- 
works predicted Ronald Reagan the winner before 8:00 p.m. Pacific 
Standard Time.l Consequently, Jimmy Carter conceded defeat before 
any west coast polls had c10sed.~ As a result of Carter's early conces- 
1. Waters, Peacock's Night to Crow, NEWSWEEK, NOV. 17, 1980, a t  82. NBC predicted 
Reagan the presidential winner a t  515  Pacific Time. At that time, only 5% of the total vote 
had been reported. Although ABC and CBS did not report Reagan the winner until two hours 
later, they still reported the outcome prior to the closing of west coast polls. Id. 
2. Id. Many adversaries of early election predictions claim that President Carter, by con- 
ceding the election early, was as irresponsible as the networks. Carter was aware that his state- 
ment would be nationally broadcast. The President, therefore, should have been sensitive to 
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sion, many west coast voters allegedly declined to vote.3 Congress re- 
sponded by asking the media to refrain from broadcasting early elec- 
tion returns and predictions and by threatening to pass legislation if 
the request was disregar~ied.~ Several states have also intervened to 
prohibit election predictions by restricting exit polling, the technique 
used to collect prediction data.6 Claiming that these restraints would 
impair their first amendment rights, newscasters. have voiced their 
intention to continue announcing  prediction^.^ Whether the first 
the effect conceding early would have on voters. For most voters, President Carter's actions 
provided a major incentive to stay a t  home or even leave the polling lines. Early Election Re- 
turns and Projections Affecting the Electoral Process: Hearings Held Jointly Before the 
Comm. on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Pro- 
tection and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1981) 
(statement of Congressman Robert Matusi) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
3. November 2, 1980 has been termed the day of "uproar in the west." The news media 
reported people leaving the lines outside polling places and drivers on their way to the polls 
going home. Hearings, supra note 2, a t  3 (statement of David Broder, Washington Post). Losers 
of close local races claimed that the broadcasts had cost them the election. For example, Repre- 
sentative A1 Ullman (D-OR) lost in 1980 by 1% of the vote. Additionally, 20 year veteran 
James E. Coreman of California lost by 796 votes in a race where more than 19,000 people 
voted. The former candidate argued an increased voter turnout would have favored their cam- 
paigns. The early election predictions destroyed the "coattail effect," which each candidates 
had counted on. Friendly, Exit Polls of Voters Pose Question of News u. Effect on Elections, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1983, $ A, at 22, col. 1. 
4. Broder, TV Newsmen to Continue Exit Poll Use, Washington Post, July 22, 1983, $ A, 
a t  3, col. 1. 
Two bills aimed a t  eliminating early election predictions were introduced during the 97th 
Congress. H.R. 3556 proposed sealing the ballots in presidential elections until all polling places 
closed. H.R. 3557 provided for a uniform time for the closing of polling places in all regular 
elections of Representatives to Congress, United States Senators, and electors of the President 
and Vice President of the United States. Neither bill, however, was passed. Election Day Prac- 
tices and Election Projections: Hearings Held Before the Task Force on Elections of the 
Comm. on House Admin. and the Subcomm. on Tele-Communications, Consumer Protection, 
and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 45-48 (1981- 
82) [hereinafter cited as Election Hearings]. 
Congress' failure to pass legislation may be, in part, an attempt to demonstrate good faith 
to the judiciary. Legislation aimed a t  curtailing early election predictions will probably face 
constitutional challenges. Thus Congressmen may hope the courts, when considering these chal- 
lenges, will take judicial notice of the legislature's attempts to exhaust all possible alternatives 
before resorting to legislation. 
5. Hawaii has also passed legislation aimed a t  preventing exit polling. HAWAII REV. STAT. 
$ 12-52 (1976) (restricting solicitation within a 1000 feet radius from polling places). Both 
Washington and Idaho have passed state resolutions asking Congress to prevent early electoral 
returns. Hearings, supra note 2, a t  185-86, 188-89. Additionally, the California legislature has 
proposed changing its anti-solicitation statute from prohibiting exit polling within 100 feet to 
prohibiting it within 500 feet. Id. a t  180. 
6. Hearings, supra note 2, a t  180. Contra L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1984, $ VI, a t  11, col. 1 
(citing 16 local television and radio stations that agreed not to release election-day exit poll 
predictions until polls closed); telephone interview with Bob Furnand, Political Editor of the 
Cable News Network (July 2, 1984) (The Cable News Network [CNN] has agreed to refrain 
from broadcasting early election pxojections. CNN will, however, broadcast actual results as 
they become available regardless of' whether all polls are closed.). 
Heinonline - -  36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 490 1984 
19841 EARLY ELECTION PREDICTIONS 491 
amendment protects these early predictions has become a paramount 
issue in recent elections years. 
This note analyzes the constitutional ramifications of legislative 
attempts to restrict early election predictions. First, specific congres- 
sional proposals and state legislative enactments will be examined. 
Secondly, the various standards of review the Supreme Court applies 
when government regulation threatens to infringe upon first amend- 
ment free speech will be examined. Lastly, this paper will examine 
the competing interests involved in early election predictions and will 
conclude that limitations on this process would be an unconstitu- 
tional impairment of the public's first amendment rights. 
Network television stations base their early election predictions 
on data obtained from voters at  polling sites.? Voters are questioned 
regarding their socio-economic background, the candidate they se- 
lected, and the reason for their sele~tion.~ By revealing the character- 
istics and electoral decisions of American voters, exit polls enable 
networks to predict election outcomes before any actual vote totals 
are a~ailable.~ 
Claiming that outcome predictions undermine national elections, 
many critics advocate the prohibition of exit polling.1° In 1980, west 
Recently, the three major networks agreed not to project the results o f  presidential races in  
a state until that state's polls have closed. This agreement does not, however, preclude net- 
works from projecting a winner prior to the closing o f  west coast polls. Clouding TV's Crystal 
Ball, TIME, Jan. 28, 1984, at  47. Such a proposal is -not necessarily a new policy for the net- 
works. See Broadcast Media Hearings, infra note 10, at  12 (statement o f  George Watson, Vice- 
President ABC News) (in 1982 ABC would not predict any race in  any state until all polls had 
closed in  that state). 
7. See generally Levy, The Methodology and Performance of Election Day Polls, 47 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 54, 56 (1983). 
CBS pollster, Warren Mitofsky, pioneered exit polling in  1967. Since then, it has become 
the predominate method b y  which networks report electoral winners. Like a Suburban Swim- 
ming Pool, n h 5 ,  NOV. 17, 1980, at  97. 
8. Levy, supra note 7 ,  at  56. 
9. Reid, Exit Polls Had Pols Heading for Their Tom-Toms, Washington Post, Mar. 1, 
1984, 3 A, at 7 ,  col. 1. During the 1984 New Hampshire Presidential primary, exit pollsters 
predicted Gary Hart the winner at  12:OO p.m. No actual vote totals had been reported at  that 
time. Id. 
10. See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast 
Media in Elections: Hearings Held Jointly Before the Task Force on Elections of the Comm. 
on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, 
and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-172 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Broadcast Media Hearings]; Broadcast Media and Early Election Predic- 
tions: Hearing before the Comm. on House Administration and Subcomm. on Energy and Fi- 
nance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-171 (1984). 
Several government and media officials, in an effort to combat exit polling, have proposed 
alternative methods o f  conducting election day voting. Networks advocate a nationwide uni- 
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coast voter turnout dropped as much as two percent from the previ- 
ous presidential election." Following the announcement of network 
predictions, many of the voters standing in line a t  the polls left and 
most west coast polling sites reported a sharp decline in voter turn- 
out.12 Arguably, by reducing the incentive to vote, election predic- 
tions based on exit polls could have a drastic effect on the "one-man, 
one-vote" system of go~ernment. '~ 
Conversely, many people dispute claims that exit polling deleteri- 
ously affects voter turnout. East and west coast voter turnout de- 
creased by a roughly equal amount in the 1980 presidential election.14 
Furthermore, opponents of an exit poll ban assert that no empirical 
data exists to support the contentions made by proponents of 
legislation.16 
Concerned that statu1;ory limitations on exit polling might be un- 
form voting period. TV Newsmen to Continue Exit Poll Use, Wash. Post, July 22, 1983, § A, at  
3, col. 3. Congressman Mario Biaggi and Senator S.I. Hayakawa propose a different alternative. 
The Biaggi proposal would move election day to Sunday and stagger voting hours so that polls 
everywhere across the nation would open and close a t  the same time. Hearings, supra note 2, a t  
110. Another propcsal would revise voting times based on time zones, i.e., east coast polls would 
be open from 11:OO a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern time and west coast polls would be open from 8:00 
a.m. to 500 p.m. Pacific time. Id. a t  131. Each of these proposals, however, is inherently flawed 
for several reasons. Perhaps the largest problem is that networks are able to produce election 
predictions within hours after the polls open. Poll closings, therefore, are irrelevant absent co- 
operation from networks. See Hearings, supra note 2, a t  130-31 (statement of Daniel E. Boat- 
right, Senator of California) (detailed discussion and critique of proposed legislative remedies). 
11. Hearings, supra note 2, a t  84-85. The "most careful" analysis of the effect of election 
predictions suggests a 2.7% decrease in voter turnout. Id. a t  4. 
12. Id. a t  233-35 (reactions from election board inspectors regarding premature election 
reports). See also id. a t  331, 337 (charts summarizing impacts of exposure to news coverage on 
the turnout of eligible voters); Election Hearings, supra note 4, at  122 (chart assessing the 
distribution of reported times of hearing projections and concession speech). 
13. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text. 
14. Hearings, supra note 2, td 84-85. 
15. Broder, supra note 4. In 1964, Lang & Lang conducted a study of California voter 
reaction to media projections of a dohnson victory four hours before the polls closed. Research 
since then has consistently confirmed their finding that mass media broadcasts on election day, 
reporting both probable and actual returns, have a negligible effect on both the nonvoting rate 
and the outcome of Presidential elections. Hearings, supra note 2, at  303. See generally Du- 
Bois, Election Night Projections and Voter Turnout in the West, 1983 AM. POL. Q. 349 (study 
finding exit polling does not affect voter turnout); Hearings, supra note 2, a t  306 (statement of 
Professor Laura Appleton) (empirical study of exit polling has shown no discernible effects on 
voter turnout). 
The news media claim a high degree of accuracy in their early election predictions. See 
Broadcast Media Hearings, supra note 10, a t  12 (statement of George Watson, Vice President 
ABC News) (in 1982 ABC was 100% accurate in their prediction of 69 senatorial and guberna- 
torial races); id. a t  18 (statement of Van Gordon Sauter, President CBS News) (in 1982 CBS 
news was 100% accurate in its prediction of 36 senatorial and gubernatorial races). 
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con~titutional,"~ Congress has not yet passed restrictive legislation. 
Instead, a joint house committee17 recently passed several resolutions 
asking networks to voluntarily refrain from projecting election results 
prior to poll closings.18 House of Representatives Concurrent Resolu- 
tion 227 specifically calls upon the television and radio industries to 
refrain from predicting election results until all polls throughout the 
country have closed.19 Additionally, House of Representatives Reso- 
lution 395 forcefully urges the news media to adopt guidelines to en- 
sure that data from exit polls will not be used prior to poll c los ing~.~~ 
16. Hearings, supra note 2, at 247 (statement of Mark Gaede, Field Representative of 
Congressman Les AuCoin) ("These proposals clearly avoid a Fit Amendment confronta- 
tion."). See Columbia Broadcast Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1972) 
("Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic free- 
dom consistent with its public obligation."). See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election 
Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast Media Hearings, supra note 10. 
17. The joint committee is formally titled The Committee on House Administration and 
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Commit- 
tee on Energy and Commerce. 
18. To date, Congress has passed over eight resolutions and proposed more than six bills 
aimed at  curtailing exit polling. Gainesville Sun, June 27, 1984, § A, at  7 col. 1. See Election 
Hearings, supra note 4, a t  7-8, 12-13, 21-23, 35-36, 45-46, 47-48. 
19. H.R. CON. RES. 227, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) provides as follows: 
(1) in the 1980 and 1982 general elections, broadcasters made projections of election 
results in many States while polls were still open; 
(2) those projections may have decreased voter participation and affected close 
elections; 
(3) early projections of election results undermine the belief of individuals in the 
importance of their votes-a belief that is essential in a democratic society; 
(4) rapidly developing technology makes it possible that projections of election re- 
sults will be made earlier and in more elections; 
(5) a uniform poll closing time will not solve this problem if projections of election 
results are based on exit interviews; and 
(6) with the approach of the 1984 election, there is continued concern about the 
impact of early projections of election results on the electoral process. SEC. 2. In light of 
the findings set forth in the first section of this resolution, i t  is the sense of the Congress 
that, to maintain the appropriate balance between freedom of the press and the integrity 
of the electoral process, in future elections - 
(1) broadcasters and other members of the news media should voluntarily refrain 
from projecting election results before the polls close; and 
(2) the news media, including industry, trade, and professional organizations, 
should adopt guidelines to assure that data from exit interviews are not used to pro- 
ject election results before the polls close. 
Resolution 227 has since been amended to read identically to the language contained in 
resolution 321. See infra note 21. 
20. H.R. CON. RES. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) provides as follows: 
Calling upon the television and radio industry and other members of the news media 
voluntarily to refrain from projecting Presidential election results or making predictions 
in Presidential elections on election day until all the polls throughout the United States 
have closed. 
Whereas in 1980, on the west coast, electronic media made Presidential election 
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More recently, the enti:re House adopted Resolution 321 which calls 
for networks to refrain :from characterizing or predicting any election 
results until the race in question has ended.21 Subsequently, the 
projects a t  330 postmeridian; 
Whereas the voter turnout in 1980 was the lowest since 1948; 
Whereas in 1980, 3 per centurn of registered voters in the Western United States 
reported that they did not go to the polls because of early election projections by televi- 
sion and radio; 
Whereas in 1980, countless eyewitnesses reported individuals leaving polling places 
following announcements by broadcasters of a projected Presidential winner; 
Whereas rapidly developing technology and techniques make it probable that pro- 
jections will be made earlier in future elections; 
Whereas a decline in voter participation is an unacceptable trend for a healthy, vi- 
brant political environment; 
Whereas early election projections do not serve any significant societal purpose and 
are unnecessary and potentially damaging to the political process and voter 
participation; 
Whereas the right of American to cast informed and educated votes is the comer- 
stone of our democracy and freedom of the press is intended to further that basic right; 
and 
Whereas Congress has a compelling interest and inherent duty to protect the voting 
rights of all Americans and to seek an increase in participation in the electoral process: 
Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls upon the television and radio 
industry and other members of the news media voluntarily to refrain from projecting 
Presidential election results or making predictions in Presidential elections on election 
day until all the polls throughout the United States have closed. 
21. H.R. CON. RES. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) provides: 
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress 
finds that - 
(1) in the 1980 and 1982 general elections, broadcasters made projections of election 
results in many States while polls were still open; 
(2) those projections may have decreased voter participation and affected close 
elections; 
(3) early projections of election results undermine the belief of individuals in the 
importance of their votes - a belief that is essential in a democratic society; 
(4) rapidly developing technology makes i t  possible that projections of election re- 
sults will be made earlier and in more elections, especially in States with more than one 
poll closing time (which States might consider adopting a single closing time); 
(5) if projections of election results are based on exit interviews and the news media 
do not voluntarily refrain from making those projections before the polls close, then a 
uniform closing time will not solve this problem; and 
(6) with the approach of the 1984 election, there is continued concern about the 
impact of early projections of election results on the electoral process. 
SEC. 2. In light of the findings set forth in the first section of this resolution, it is the 
sense of the Congress that, to maintain the appropriate balance between freedom of the 
press and the integrity of the (electoral process, in future elections 
(1) broadcasters and other members of the news media should voluntarily refrain 
from characterizing or projecting results of an election before all polls for the ofice 
have closed; and 
(2) the news media, including industry, trade, and professional organizations, 
should adopt guidelines to assure that data from exit interviews are not used to char- 
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United States Senate joined the House in adopting the res0lution.2~ 
A congressional resolution is merely the adoption of a motion con- 
cerning subject matter which would not typically constitute a stat- 
~ t e . ~ ~  As a result, a congressional resolution does not carry the force 
of law and no penalties exist for non~ompliance.2~ Thus, networks 
face no legal liability for continuing to predict election results. A res- 
olution may, however, have the effect of law if both houses of Con- 
gress and the President approve House Resolution 321 may well 
become law through this pro~edure.2~ Therefore although networks 
have no present legal duty to comply with the mandate of House 
Resolution 321, their noncompliance may encourage future statutory 
regulation. 
The absence of election prediction regulations evinces congres- 
sional awareness of the delicate balance between free speech and the 
interests of government in preserving the integrit5; of the electoral 
process. If Congress acts on its threats to statutorily restrict exit pol- 
ling,> this legislation is certain to encounter constitutional challenges. 
American courts must, therefore, stand ready to determine whether 
curtailing exit polling and early election predictions is permissible 
under the Constitution. 
Historically, the judiciary has paid great deference to the press?? 
A robust press promotes free and open discussion. Free speech is, 
therefore, considered a preeminent right under democratic the0ry.2~ 
acterize or project results of an election before all polls for the office have closed. 
22. Reaves, Stifle Exit Polk;?, 70 A.B.A. J. 33 (Nov. 1984). 
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (5th ed. 1979). 
24. Id. The distinction between a joint resolution and a concurrent resolution of Congress 
' 
is that the former requires the approval of the President while the latter does not. Id. 
25. Id. A resolution passed in both houses of the legislature, signed by the presiding of- 
ficers of both houses and approved by the President has the effect of a law as that term is used 
in the Constitution. A joint resolution signed by the President may alter, modify, or create law. 
See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680,692 (1854). See also Oklahoma News Co. v. Ryan, 101 Okla 151,153, 
224 P. 969, 972 (1924) (extending this principle to the states). 
26. See supra notes 24-25. 
27. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL L W 859-60 (1983) [hereinafter 
cited as J. NOWAK]. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,576 (1980) 
("without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscer- 
ated"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,691 (1972) (news gathering qualifies for first amend- 
ment protection). See generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 
COLUM. L REV. 838 (1972) (suggesting the news media's most important function is to'sewe as a 
conduit of information). 
28. Historically, the first amendment has enjoyed a preferred position among other con- 
stitutional rights. The concept of a preferred position for the amendment arose in dicta in 
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Accordingly, courts have rarely allowed the first amendment to be 
abridged in furtherance of governmental  interest^.^^ 
To withstand constitutional attack, a statute regulating free 
speech must survive close judicial scrutiny. Where laws threaten to 
restrict speech, courts typically balance the various conflicting inter- 
ests involved.s0 In balancing these interests, courts focus on the gov- 
ernmental regulation's purpose, the first amendment rights abridged, 
and the severity of the abridgement.31 A court will vary its level of 
scrutiny depending on the degree of first amendment infringement.32 
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene, Chief Justice Stone 
suggested in a footnote that congressional limitations on the first amendment should be nar- 
rowly construed. Five years later, the Court explicitly held that freedom of speech has a pre- 
ferred position. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See generally J. NOWAK, 
supra note 27, a t  864-67. 
Nowak explores the first amendment in terms of both the preferred position of free speech 
and the absolutist view. Under the absolutist view the first amendment would not be subject to 
balancing by definition. Rather, the judiciary would have to invalidate every law no matter how 
incidentally i t  burdened free speech. Recognizing the impracticality of this view, Nowak sug- 
gests that if in fact speech is not an absolute right, it is certainly in a preferred position to 
other rights in the Constitution. Id. See also Cox, Freedom of the Press, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 3. 
The theory that first amendment protection of free speech is essential to an intelligent self- 
government in a democratic sctciety was strongly advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn. 
Meiklejohn asserted that the objective of the framers was to help American citizens understand 
their own political institutions. Under Meikeljohn's analysis, therefore, citizens should have 
access to all available information in the political spectrum. A. MEIKLEJOHN. FREE SPEECH AND 
ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948). See also L. TRIBE, A ~ R I C A N  CONSTITUTIONAL L W 
576 (1978) (discussion of Milton's "market place of ideas" theory); Polsby, Buckley u. Valeo: 
The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6-8 (collective interest in free 
speech provides mechanism for citizens to exercise self-government). 
29. See infra note 34. 
30. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748 (1976) (state's interest in preserving the integrity of the pharmaceutical profession 
held incidental to the first amendment right of citizens to receive information on prescription 
drug prices); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (state interest in avoiding 
concentration of "adult movie theaters" was weighed against zoning restrictions prohibiting the 
location of the theaters within 1(H)O feet of each other; slight burden on speech held to be 
justified by that interest); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (state interest in regulating 
dissemination of religious views weighed against discretionary sales licensing system; burden on 
free speech was too great to uphold the state's interest). 
31. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). In Konigsberg, Justice 
Harlan, writing for the majority, presented his theory of judicial balancing. Harlan suggested an 
approach for examining legislative regulations which appear to encroach on the guarantees of 
the first amendment. When a valid governmental interest exists, the Court must weigh that 
interest against the traditional guarantees of free speech. The first amendment may not be 
suppressed unless the government can justify the need for suppression. Id. a t  49-51. See also L. 
TRIBE, supra note 28, a t  580-84; Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 
(1962). 
32. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (a government regulation 
which restricts speech based on its content will be invalidated unless the government can 
demonstrate the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn 
to meet that purpose) with Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 
640, 648 (1981) (a content-neutral government regulation will be upheld as long as the regula- 
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Courts generally employ a pure balancing of interests when the 
governmental regulation involved is not intended to control spee~h.3~ 
The courts weigh the regulations' effect on expression against the 
governmental interest served by its enfor~ement .~~ A content-neutral 
regulation is permissible if it is the least restrictive means of'accom- 
plishing a valid governmental and if it merely restricts the 
time, place, or manner of the speech.3e Additionally, reasonable alter- 
native methods of communication must be available to both speakers 
and listeners?' 
In contrast to content-neutral regulations, content-based regula- 
tions favor certain modes of communication over others.3s These reg- 
ulations are presumptively unconstitutional under the first amend- 
ment.39 The Supreme Court has allowed content based restrictions 
only when the governmental interest involved is compelling, substan- 
tion merely rejects the time, place, or manner of speech). See also Stone, Restrictions of 
Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 81, 82 (1978). 
33. The Court's balancing analysis under which it  weighs competing interests arose from 
dicta in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,161 (1939). See Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 
38 MD. L. REV. 387, 387 (1979). 
34. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2128 (1984). 
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (city's interest in avoiding 
visual clutter was sufticient to justify a prohibition of billboards); Young v. American Mini 
Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city regulation requiring "adult movie theaters" to be 1000 feet 
apart upheld against first amendment challenge); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298 (1974) (Court upheld city's prohibition of political advertising on its buses stating that the 
city was entitled to protect the aesthetic and efficiency aspects of of its mass transit system); 
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (right of individuals to publicly protest was subordinate 
to city ordinance prohibiting demonstrations on jailhouse property). 
35. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). See Stone, supra note 32, at  86. 
36. City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2130. See L. TRIBE, 
supra note 28, a t  682-83. 
37. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542-43 
(1980) (statute prohibiting utility companies from using bill inserts to discuss political matters 
left no alternative mode of communication). 
38. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (regulations restricting 
speech based on its content will be invalidated unless the government demonstrates a compel- 
ling interest in upholding the regulation and the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet the 
government's needs); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (content re- 
striction on expressive activity undercuts the "profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open"). 
39. The Court has defined three exceptions to the general principle that content-based 
restrictions are unconstitutional. A content-based regulation will be held unconstitutional un- 
less a compelling governmental interest justifies the regulation, the speech itself is unprotected 
by the first amendment, or the speech poses a clear and present danger. L. TRIBE, supra note 
28, a t  670. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscene language not 
protected by the &st amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) 
(fighting words not protected by the f i s t  amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 
(1969) (speech may be regulated if it is designed to incite or produce imminent unlawful ac- 
tion). See J. NOWAK, supra note 27, a t  873-82, 954-57, 1008-027; Bogen, supra note 33, a t  441. 
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tial or cogent.40 
The court applied a content-neutral analysis in Young v. Ameri- 
can Mini  theatre^.^^ In Young, a Detroit "anti skid-row" ordinance 
prohibited locating adult movie theaters within 1,000 feet of any two 
other "regulated uses"42 or within 500 feet of residential areas.43 An 
adult theater operator brought suit alleging the statute44 was an im- 
permissible content based re~ t r i c t ion .~~  The Court began its analysis 
by considering the content which was to be statutorily controlled. 
The Court found that the city's general zoning law required all mo- 
tion picture theaters to satisfy certain locational  requirement^.^' 
Therefore, the statute merely regulated the place where adult films 
could be shown.47 Because these restrictions constituted merely a 
permissible time, place, or manner regulation, the Court's content- 
neutral analysis considered only whether the city's community inter- 
est in avoiding the conce:ntration of adult movie theaters outweighed 
the public's first amend~nent right to receive i n fo rma t i~n .~~  I t  con- 
cluded the city's interest in the present and future character of its 
neighborhoods justified u.pholding the statute.4e 
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 
U.S. 455,461 (1980) (for a government regulation to be sustained, the government must demon- 
strate the legislation serves a "substantial" state interest); Regents of University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (a state must demonstrate a "compelling" governmental 
interest when burdening a class of persons); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 
(1960) (the state must demonstrate a "cogent" interest to justify abridgement of the first 
amendment). 
41. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Comment, Young u. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: 
A Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391 (1976); Brest, The Supreme 
Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
42. 427 U.S. a t  54. The zoning ordinance defined regulated uses as theaters, bookstores, 
liquor stores, pool halls, pawnshops and other similar activities. Id. a t  52 n.3. 
43. Id. a t  52. 
44. The Detroit Michigan ordinance defined "Adult Motion Picture Theater" as: "an en- 
closed building . . . for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on 
matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical 
Areas'." Id. a t  53 n.5. 
45. Id. a t  55. The controversy centered on the distinction between types of adult theaters. 
The Detkoit zoning ordinance differentiated between theaters featuring sexually explicit movies 
and those which do not. Id. a t  56. 
46. Id. a t  62. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. a t  62-63. Detroit argued its ordinance was necessary to the community under the 
theory of inverse zoning. Inverse zoning suggests cities forbid certain businesses from locating 
in particular areas under the theoly that concentration of these businesses are injurious to a 
neighborhood. See id. a t  54 & n.6. ,4 neighborhood can prevent deterioration by forbidding the 
formation of such concentrations. See id. Detroit's first inverse zoning ordinance was passed in 
1962. The city added "adult bookstores" to the list of regulated uses in 1972. Brest, supra note 
41, a t  196-97 n.5. 
49. 427 U.S. at  72. The Court concluded the city's interest in "the present and future 
character of its neighborhoods" justified an incidental restriction on the first amendment. Id. 
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In contrast to the Young case, the Supreme Court decision of Po- 
lice Department v. Mosely60 illustrates the approach taken by courts 
in analyzing content-based regulations. Mosely addressed a Chicago 
city ordinance which prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a 
school unless the picketing involved a peaceful labor dispute.61 The 
Court determined that, in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
any government restriction selectively excluding a particular type of 
speech must serve a substantial governmental interests2 and be nar- 
rowly tailored to meet a specific goal.ss Although Justice Marshall, 
writing for a unanimous court, noted that the government could jus- 
tify the selective exclusion of persons from a public forum in a few 
rare instances, such as where necessary to prevent public disorder, 
such justifications would be carefully scrutinized." The Court con- 
50. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
51. Id. a t  92-93. The Supreme Court considered Mosely along with Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Grayned invalidated an almost identical ordinance which the 
Illinois Supreme Court had upheld. 408 U.S. at  94. 
The Mosely Court characterized picketing as a method of expressing an idea which is sub- 
ject to broad state regulation. 408 U.S. at  97. The Mosely Court recognized, however, that state 
regulation must give way to free speech principles when these regulations threaten to suppress 
certain ideas. Mosely agreed with Justice Black's opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 
(1965) which stated: 
[B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views [but 
prohibiting other sorts of picketing], Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among 
the views it  is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law 
what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and 
may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitu- 
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
408 U.S. at 97-98. 
52. 408 U.S. at  99. 
53. 408 U.S. at 101 & n.8. The city argued the restriction is merely a device for preventing 
disruption of the school. In contrast, the Court held the city ordinance described picketing in 
terms of the content it  wished to control. The essence of content-control is censorship, a con- 
cept impermissible under the first amendment. Id. a t  99. 
See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). In Carey, the Court invalidated an Illinois 
statute which prohibited all picketing of residences or dwellings except for peaceful picketing of 
employment places involved in labor disputes. Relying on Mosely, the Court concluded the 
state's goal of protecting privacy could not be advanced in a way which allowed picketing only 
in certain areas of the city. The restriction permitted the expression of views on one particular 
subject and thus was repugnant to the h t  amendment. The majority explicitly stated, how- 
ever, that an anti-residential statute would be upheld if it was uniform and non-discrimiitory. 
Id. a t  470. 
54. 408 U.S. at  98-99. The city argued it  had a substantial interest in preventing school 
disruption. While recognizing the need for order in the city school system, the Court concluded 
that Chicago had failed to meet its burden. The Court noted that the city itself had previously 
determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours was not an undue interference 
with school. Id. at 100. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school 
prohibition against wearing ann bands invalidated absent proof that the rule was necessary to 
avoid substantial interference with school discipline). 
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cluded that peaceful labor picketing during school hours did not un- 
duly interfere with school activities. Thus, the city was unable to sus- 
tain its heavy burden and the Court invalidated the content-based 
Two recent federal district court decisions exemplify the contrast- 
ing levels of scrutiny which the Supreme Court might apply to the 
exit poll bans proposed :by states.6e Dissatisfied with the unenforce- 
ability of the congressioinal resolutions, the Florida6' and Washing- 
t o d B  state legislatures have imposed regulations prohibiting exit pol- 
ling.6B Predictably, these regulatory schemes have been challenged as 
unconstitutional infringements on first amendment rights. Viewing 
the regulation as a content-based restriction of speech, the Federal 
Middle District Court of Florida found the statute unconst i t~t ional .~~ 
The Washington court, however, in a cursory declaratory judgment 
and order, apparently vi,ewed a nearly identical statute as content- 
neutral and upheld i t  as a permissible time, place, manner 
re~triction.~' 
A. Washington State: The Content-Neutral Approach 
Daily Herald v. Muni.oe2 was the first case to directly address a 
state exit poll law. Munro dealt with a Washington state statute 
which made conducting an exit poll within 300 feet of a polling place 
a m i s d e m e a n ~ r . ~ ~  Newscasterse4 challenged the statute as an uncon- 
55. 408 U.S. a t  102. 
56. See Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich, 590 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Daily Herald Co. v. 
Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. Wash. July 11, 1984). 
57. See FLA. STAT. 3 104.36 (1983) (prohibits solicitation within 100 yards of any polling 
place). 
58. See WASH. REV. CODE ANPI. 3 29.51.020 (1983) (prohibits solicitation within 300 feet of 
polling place). 
59. See also supra note 5. 
60. 590 F. Supp. a t  928. 
61. No. C83-840T a t  1-2. 
62. Id. 
63. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 3 29.51.020 (1983). The Washington statute provides as 
follows: 
(1) On the day of any primary, general or special election, no person may, within a pol- 
ling place, or in any public area. within three hundred feet of any entrance to such pol- 
ling place: 
(a) Do any electioneering; (b) Circulate cards or handbills of any kind; (c) Solicit 
signatures to any kind of petition; (d) Engage in any practice which interferes with 
the freedom of voters to exercise their franchise or disrupts the administration of the 
polling place; or (e) Conduct tiny exit poll or public opinion poll with voters. 
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stitutional restriction of speech and ~ommentary.~~ The information 
gathered from polling data enabled the newscasters to report voting 
trends as well as electoral outcomes.B6 Requiring newsmen to stand at  
least 300 feet from the election area allegedly prevented them from 
gathering information and disseminating it to the public. The chal- 
lengers argued that this hindrance violated the public's constitutional 
right to receive information and prevented the press from fulfilling 
its obligation of disseminating it.B7 
Viewing the statute as content-neutral, the Munro court seemed 
to apply an analysis largely identical to that used in Young.es The 
court viewed the Washington statute as a restriction on the place 
where exit polling could occur, thereby rejecting the plaintifPs argu- 
ment that the legislation restricted a certain area of protected 
speech.69 The court did not explicitly state the regulation was a valid 
time, place, or manner restriction. Rather, the brief opinion merely 
listed each requirement necessary to uphold a valid time, place, or 
manner restriction and stated that the Washington statute satisfied 
those req~irements .~~ Under the court's superfluous analysis, exit pol- 
(2) No person may obstruct the doors or entries to a building in which a polling place is 
located or prevent free access to and from any polling place. Any sheriff, deputy sheriff, 
or municipal law enforcement officer shall prevent such obstruction, and may arrest any 
person creating such obstruction. (3) No person may: 
(a) Except as provided in RCW 29.34.157, remove any ballot from the polling place 
before the closing of the polls; or (b) Solicit any voter to show his or her ballot. 
(4) No person other than an inspector or judge of election may receive from any voter a 
voted ballot or deliver a blank ballot to such elector. (5) Any violation of this section is a 
misdemeanor under RCW 9A.20.010, and shall be punished under RCW 9A.20.020(3), 
and the person convicted may be ordered to pay the costs of prosecution. 
64. American Broadcasting Co. (ABC), Columbia Broadcast System, Inc. (CBS), National 
Broadcasting Co. (NBC), The New York Times Co. and The Daily Herald Co. were co-plaintiffs 
in this action. Plaintiffs' complaint a t  1, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. 
Wash. filed Apr. 20,1984). The Daily Herald Company is a subsidiary of the Washington Post. 
Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1983, at 4, col. 4. 
65. Plaintiffs' complaint a t  9, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. Wash. 
filed Apr. 20, 1984). 
66. See id. a t  6-8. 
67. See generally id. a t  10. 
68. See No. C83-840T a t  2. In viewing the statute as "content-neutral" the Munro order 
conformed to reasoning typically employed by the Supreme Court in cases when the regulation 
is not intended to control speech. See id. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also J. NOWAK, supra note 27, at  864-78; Brest, 
supra note 41, a t  196-205; Stone, supra note 32, a t  81. 
69. See No. C83-840T at 1-2. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
70. See No. C83-840T at 1-2 (the state of Washington has a legitimate and compelling 
interest in regulating orderly elections, the statute is the least restrictive means of accomplish- 
ing that interest, and it  is neither vague nor overbroad). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 377 (1968) (a government regulation is justified if i t  furthers a substantial governmental 
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ling was not unconstitutional. Rather, the regulation merely sought 
to govern the permissible area in which exit polling could be con- 
ducted. Thus, the statute constituted a valid time, place, manner re- 
~ t r i c t i o n . ~ ~  Accordingly, the court employed a balancing test to deter- 
mine whether the government interest involved outweighed the 
public's first amendment right to receive inf~rmation.~' In upholding 
the statute, the court noted that both the state's interest in main- 
taining orderly polls and the government's interest in preserving west 
coast votes justified the restraint on exit polls.73 
B. Florida: The Content-Based Approach 
In contrast, a Florida federal district court employed a content- 
based approach and invalidated a statute strikingly similar to the one 
in Munro. In Clean-up '84 u. H e i n r i ~ h ? ~  a Florida statute which im- 
posed criminal sanctions on individuals soliciting signatures within 
300 feet of a polling site76 was challenged by a political action com- 
mittee.76 Based on the committee's arguments, the court held the 
statute violated the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech 
and ass~c ia t ion .~~ 
In reaching the decision, the Heinrich court weighed the state's 
interests in preserving the integrity of the electoral process against 
citizens' first amendment rights.78 Unlike Munro, however, the court 
interest, the governmental interest is directed a t  the conduct of the speaker rather than the 
speech, and the regulation is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government's 
goal). 
71. See No. C83-840T at 1-2. The Court did not explicitly state the restriction was a valid 
time, place, and manner regulation. The court's brief order merely listed each requirement nec- 
essary to uphold a valid time, place, and manner restriction and stated that the Washington 
statute satisfied these restrictions. Id. 
72. See No. C83-840T a t  2 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 1984). 
73. See id. The court's order was very brief. I t  explicitly stated that no genuine issue 
existed as to any material fact in controversy. The Washington restriction only incidentally 
restricted plaintiffs' ability to gather news. The state, however, was found to have shown a 
compelling governmental interest which justified upholding the state law. The opinion did not 
cite any evidence or reasoning to support its holding. Id. a t  1. 
74. 590 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Fla. 1984). 
75. FLA. STAT. § 104.36 (1983) provides as follows: 
Solicitation near polling places. -- Any person who, within 100 yards of any polling place 
on the day of any election, distributes or attempts to distribute any political or campaign 
material; solicits or attempts to solicit any vote, opinion, or contribution for any purpose; 
solicits or attempts to solicit a signature on any petition; or, except in an established 
place of business, sells or attempts to sell any item is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first 
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
76. 590 F. Supp. at  929. 
77. Id. a t  930. 
78. Id. at  930-31. 
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viewed the statute as a content-based regulati~n.?~ Thus, under the 
Mosley test, the state had to prove both that a substantial govern- 
mental interest was involved and that the interest was narrowly tai- 
lored to meet a specific goal.80 
In invalidating the statute, the Heinrich court rejected the state's 
1 argument that exit polling restrictions were necessary to maintain or- der at  the polls.81 The court refused to uphold a law which, based on 
some vague specter of future disorder, substantially infringed on first 
amendment rightsa2 Furthermore, the court chastised the state for 
not adopting a less restrictive means of insuring orderly voting proce- 
d u r e ~ ? ~  The state argued that because poll workers themselves could 
not maintain orderly elections, there was a need for legislation. The 
court held, however, that these problems would have to be remedied 
in some way other than a "blanket prohibition" of signature solicita- 
tions at  the polls on election day.84 
The Supreme Court will almost certainly consider the constitu- 
tionality of state exit poll laws and the curtailing of early election 
predictions in the near future.86 Alternatively, if federal legislation 
aimed at  newscasts is passed, the Court is likely to encounter a con- 
stitutional challenge to the law?s In either instance, critics will level 
a number of charges at  exit poll laws. Critics would argue that exit 
poll laws constitute an unreasonable time, place, and manner regula- 
tion which leaves no alternative method of communication. They 
may also argue the classification of information solicitation based on 
question content violates the first amendment. Finally, they may as- 
sert that laws regulating newscasters are unconstitutional prior re- 
straints on protected communication. The Supreme Court will have 
79. Id. The court stated the right to free debate on political issues is one of the highest 
values safeguarded by our Constitution, a right that cannot be infringed without a showing of 
compelling justification. Although the State can enact reasonable regulations to ensure orderly 
elections, those regulations may not place "substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of 
candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions 
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate." Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 
(1976)). 
80. 408 U.S. at  101-02. 
81. 590 F. Supp. at 930. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at  930-31. Testimony indicated at least two centers for political discussion were 
within 300 feet of polling places. Under the statute, a person soliciting signatures for a petition 
on election day at one of these sites could be charged with a misdemeanor. Id. at 930. 
84. Id. at  931. 
85. See supra notes 5 & 59 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text; infra notes 133-37 and accompanying 
text. 
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to develop an appropriate constitutional analysis to resolve these 
issues. 
A. Levels of Scrutiny 
In considering constitutional questions, courts assess the specific 
classification of the speech, the nature of the forum, and the conflict- 
ing interests involved. Liberty of speech and press is not an absolute 
right.s7 The limits of these rights must always be determined in light 
of the particular subject matter involved. 
The first amendment affords protection in varying degrees to dif- 
ferent categories of speech. Traditionally, full protection extends to 
pure speech, such as the right to criticize the g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  Commer- 
cial speech which advertisles a product or service for business pur- 
poses has historically been subject to substantial governmental regu- 
l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Presently, however, commercial speech appears to receive 
full first amendment p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Conversely, obscenity, libelous 
87. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1930). 
88. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969). 
The free speech clause of the Constitution was a natural response to the authoritarian 
government of the middle ages. Political authority was considered to have derived from God. 
Thus, criticizing secular authority would result in damnation. Political censorship continued for 
the three centuries prior to the Declaration of Independence. In an effort to appear superior to 
the Roman Catholic Church, English royalty required the suppression of ideas antagonistic to 
the government. The publication of statements criticizing the King was considered seditious 
libel which was equivalent to criminal assault. Further, all writing had to be licensed prior to its 
publication. Although the practice of censorship declined in colonial America, the doctrine of 
seditious libel continued. While promoting free speech which was in accordance with its politi- 
cal views, the pre-revolutionary legislature severely punished its critics. At the time the Consti- 
tution was drafted, the idea that liberty of the individual was essential to a free state finally 
prevailed. Thus, the framers adopted the first amendment, which was intended to eliminate 
censorship and destroy the doctrine of seditious libel in America. J. NOWAK, supra note 27, at  
858-61. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("offensive" criticism of the draft must 
be permitted under the first amendment). See generally Z. CHAFEE. FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1-35 (1946) (discussion of the history of free speech); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the 
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); Rabban, The First 
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years. 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981). 
89. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (the Constitution does not pro- 
tect speech for profit) and Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (state interest in 
protecting citizens privacy may prevail against rights of door to door salesmen) with Murdock 
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (state may not prevent door to door solicitation when the 
motive is religiously oriented). See ako Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 
1000 (1972) (because the Consitution protects advertising less rigorously than other communi- 
cation, the Court permitted the federal government to ban cigarette advertising on television); 
Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1080; 
Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1982). 
90. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (19761, the Court held that free speech extended to any exchange of ideas or information 
that might enable individuals to malte better informed choices. Id. Thus, under Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy, states can only relylate misleading advertising. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 
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speech and "fighting words'' are not within the scope of first amend- 
ment protecti~n.~' 
The Constitution treats the right of free and open political debate 
as a value of paramount importance. Accordingly, political speech, 
which also includes electoral ~peech,9~ receives the fullest protection 
under the first amendment.9s The first amendment prohibits restric- 
tions on candidates, citizens, and associations engaged in political ac- 
tivity. If a government regulation restricts the offering of ideas in the 
electoral arena, the law will be invalidated unless demonstrable evi- 
dence of a compelling governmental interest exists.B4 
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Har- 
tlagee6 found the government's interest in guaranteeing fair elections 
subordinate to first amendment rights.Bs In Brown, the Court explic- 
itly recognized Kentucky's legitimate interest in preserving the integ- 
rity of its elections.B7 Nevertheless, a unanimous Court found that, on 
balance, a candidates' right of free speech outweighed the state's in- 
terest in either prohibiting the buying of votes or controlling factual 
rnis~tatements.~~ The Court did distinguish certain areas which the 
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state may not regulate attorney advertising); Carey v. Population Serv. 
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidated a prohibition of any advertisement of display of contra- 
ceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia could not regulate advertisements 
for New York abortions even though abortions were illegal in Virginia). 
91. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauhamais v. Illi- 
nois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libelous utterances); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) (fighting words). The theory that certain forms of speech do not deserve first amend- 
ment protection has been labeled the two-level theory of free speech. The two-level doctrine 
arose from dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky 
Court held that speech which is utterly without redeeming social worth should not receive con- 
stitutional protection. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
26. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 670 (suggesting the two-level theory of free speech has 
lost much of its vitality). 
92. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218-19 (1966); Polsby, supra, at 19-20. Polsby perceives a candidate's free speech interests as 
political speech. This theory suggests that all speech concerning elections is encompassed 
within the full first amendment protection guaranteed to political speech. Id. 
93. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 
(1983). See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (first amendment has its fullest and most 
urgent application in the case of regulation of the content of political speech); United States v. 
United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 594 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The making of a 
political speech . . . has always been one of the preferred rights protected by the Constiti- 
tion."). See also Polsby, supra note 92, at  1. 
94. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at  53-54. 
95. Id. at 45. 
96. Id. at 62. 
97. Id. at  52. 
98. Id. at 52-53. Petitioner Brown was a candidate for election against incumbent Har- 
tlage. In a campaign speech attacking Hartlage, Brown promised to substantially lower his sal- 
ary if elected, thereby saving each taxpayer money. Shortly after the speech, Brown learned 
that he had violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act which prohibited candidates from 
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state could justifiably regulate, such as prohibiting candidates from 
offering monetary incentives in return for votes.99 Brown demon- 
strated, however, the heavy burden of proof the government must 
meet to justify infringing on first amendment electoral speech. 
B. Balancing of Competing Interests 
Early election predictions fall within the broad scope of political 
speech. A constitutional analysis of any legislation curtailing such 
predictions must, therefore, weigh the intensity of each competing in- 
terest. Such an analysis s:hould precisely define the purpose and im- 
portance of both the govc!rnment's interests in preserving the integ- 
rity of the electoral procc?ss and the public's interests in protecting 
free speech. 
1. The Government's Interest in the Electoral Process 
Both the state and federal governments have legitimate interests 
in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Insuring an alert, 
responsible electorate ancl preserving the individual's belief in gov- 
ernment is paramount to a democratic system.loO The Supreme Court 
has, therefore, consistently recognized the state and federal govern- 
ment's significant interest in sustaining the individual's active role in 
the electoral proce~s.'~' Although the right to vote is not constitution- 
ally protected per se,lo2 the Court has referred to voting as a funda- 
mental right preservative of all basic political and civil rights.loS This 
right has been extended to include the government's fundamental in- 
terest in preserving each citizen's vote.lo4 Opponents of early election 
predictions argue that ear:ly publication of election returns breeds ap- 
athy among voters and interferes with the government's constitu- 
making monetary promises in consideration for a vote. Brown thereafter retracted his state- 
ment. Subsequently Brown won the election and Hartlage filed suit. Id. a t  47-49. 
99. Id. a t  55. The Court specifically recognized personal solicitation in exchange for a 
specific agreement. Id. 
100. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belliotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978). See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974). 
But see Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 
124-26 (1981) (state's compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity of the electoral 
process, providing secrecy of the bnllot, increasing voter participation, and preventing harass- 
ment did not justify intrusion into first amendment protections). 
101. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. a t  787; United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 
567, 575 (1957). 
102. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973). 
103. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
104. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 105 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (" 'equal right to vote,' . . . is not 
absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the 
franchise in other ways"). 
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tional right to preserve voter confidence.lo6 
In Reynolds v. S i r n ~ , ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
"undeniable" constitutional right of citizens to vote in state and fed- 
eral elections.lo7 Reynolds struck down an Alabama reapportionment 
plan which ostensibly gave voters living in certain parts of the state a 
weighted vote.lo8 The majority believed the legislature's scheme con- 
tradicted its role as protector of the electorate.109 
The Equal Protection clause requires that all citizens have an 
equal vote, no matter where their homes may be located.l1° There- 
fore, the Reynolds Court held that an individual's right to vote is 
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is diluted in proportion 
to votes cast in other districts.ll1 Like the reapportionment plan in 
Reynolds, an early prediction of an election's outcome based on re- 
turns from the east may give voters on the east coast a more signs- 
cant role in deciding a presidential winner. Conceivably, this may 
constitute an unconstitutional dilution of west coast votes. 
Any early election prediction which could serve to reduce voter 
incentive to go to the polls seems repugnant to the principles es- 
poused in Reynolds.ll2 As distinguished from the Reynolds case, 
however, the government's primary interest in regulating exit polling 
is to safeguard a small fraction of the population from a premature 
newscast. Citizens are not physically denied access to the ballot. 
105. The 1980 election day "incident1' has caused widespread cynicism among reporters. 
This loss of confidence has likely extended to the general public. One journalist commented 
that on election day in 1980 over 83 million Americans voted in the presidential election. About 
36,000 responded to exit polls. Levy, supra note 7, a t  54. Mike Royko, a syndicated columnist, 
called for Chicagoans to lie to exit pollsters during the 1984 presidential primary. Washington 
Post, Mar. 16, 1984, $ B, at 1, col. 1. Further, Art Buchwald argued network polling methods 
have become so sophisticated that no one west of the Mississippi need vote in order to decide a 
presidential election. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 6, 1980, $ V, at 2, col. 1. 
106. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
107. Id. at  554. 
108. Id. at  568. 
109. See id. at  565. 
110. Id. at  565-66. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972) ("a citizen has a 
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens 
in the jurisdiction"). The Reynolds Court analogized dilution of a citizen's vote to invidious 
discrimination. An unequal vote due to your residence impairs basic constitutional rights under 
the fourteenth amendment as much as a bar from the polls based on race. 377 U.S. at  566. 
111. 377 U.S. at  566. See also Eva& v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,421-22 (1970) (residents of 
a mental health institute have the right to vote equal to all other citizens of the state); Kramer 
v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969) (invalidating a state statute 
granting the right to vote @ a school election to some citizens of requisite age and citizenship 
but denying that right to other citizens with the same qualifications); Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701,706 (1969) (Louisiana law providing that only "property taxpayers" have 
the right to vote in municipal utility bond elections is violative of the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution). 
112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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Rather, only their incentive to vote is diminished once a winner is 
predicted. Therefore, while the government's interest in insulating 
the election process from exit poll results may be significant, it is 
probably not substantia:l enough to override first amendment 
protections. 
2. Constitutio~lal Guarantees of Free Speech 
The Constitution's framers presupposed that free expression 
without government intervention was essential to an informed electo- 
rate. At the time the first amendment was conceived, the government 
seemed to pose the only potential threat to a free flow of informa- 
tion.lls This danger necessitated a constitutional provision which 
would keep public information purveyors free from potential govern- 
ment control. Consequently, the framers enacted the free press clause 
of the first amendment which leaves the press free to stimulate pub- 
lic discussion. Thus, the media enjoys constitutional protection predi- 
cated on the public's right to receive information. 
The press is widely considered the most practical vehicle for 
quickly disseminating information to the public as i t  becomes availa- 
ble.l14 The broadcasting media argues that delaying available presi- 
dential election information would be inconsistent with traditional 
journalistic standards.l16 The media contends the function of a jour- 
nalist is to report information in a timely and honest manner.l16 
Therefore, most networks have chosen to disregard Congress' resolu- 
tion advocating restraint in reporting exit poll results.l17 They con- 
tend that if the need to limit journalistic freedom is truly urgent, 
113. J. NOWAK, supra note 27, at 860-61. 
114. T h e  media is the only system which can successfully spread information quickly and 
accurately to  a country o f  215 million. Thus, without the large organization o f  editors and re- 
porters, self government would not work. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("The 
electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and in- 
formation has made these . . . modes o f  communication indispensable instruments o f  effective 
political speech."). 
T h e  organized print and electronic media have the enormous resources required to seek 
out, assimilate, and interpret information of  governing importance. "[T]elevision has replaced 
newspapers as the primary source o f  news for most Americans." Albert, The Federal Regula- 
tion of Radio and Television Newscasts, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 309, 310 (1982). Over 56 million 
Americans watch the early evening news broadcast by the three major networks. Id. 
115. See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast 
Media Hearings, supra note 10; Broadcast Early Elections Hearings, supra note 10. 
116. Hearings, supra note 2, nt 54. Veteran journalists have strongly asserted that, with 
the exception o f  the very rare instances when bodily harm might result, any attempt to  delay 
reporting is a mistake. Many individuals agree. For example, President Kennedy suggested that 
had he not restrained the New York Times from reporting the "Bay o f  Pigs" landing, a great 
disaster might have been averted. Id. 
117. See supra note 6. 
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Congress should pass binding corrective legislation.lls 
The Supreme Court has vigorously protected the press' role in 
disseminating electoral information. Both Brown and Reynolds ex- 
plicitly recognized the paramount value of each individual's voice in 
the electoral process.11e In Mills v. Alabama,120 the seminal case on 
the interrelationship between first amendment rights and legislative 
efforts to ensure "purer" elections, the Court unanimously invali- 
dated a broadly based corrupt practices law.121 The Alabama statute 
imposed criminal penalties on newspapers publishing editorials on 
election day which concerned election issues.122 The Mills Court ac- 
knowledged that the first amendment's major purpose was to protect 
the free discussion of all matters pertaining to the political process.123 
Overturning the lower court, the Supreme Court held that a state's 
interest in limiting media influence in a public election was not com- 
pelling enough to suppress free speech.124 
Under Mills, the government cannot silence the news media 
merely because its news stories or editorial commentaries affect vot- 
ing decisions. Mills might be distinguished from early election pre- 
dictions, however, because the latter do not merely influence the vot- 
ers' choice of candidates, but instead affect the voters' decision of 
whether to vote at  all. Notwithstanding this argument, Mills un- 
doubtedly established that courts will strictly scrutinize government 
actions barring the press from influencing voter opinions on election 
day. Under this analysis, exit polling would be presumptively pro- 
tected speech. 
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the public's right 
to receive information from the broadcasting media. In Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commi~s ion ,~~~  the 
118. Broder, supra note 4. 
119. See supra notes 95-99 & 106-11 and accompanying text. 
120. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
121. Id. a t  220. 
122. Id. a t  215-16. On election day, an Alabama newspaper carried an editorial strongly 
urging citizens to adopt a mayor-council form of government. Id. a t  215. 
123. Id. a t  218. The Court discussed a t  length the major role the press plays in a demo- 
cratic society. A vital function of the press is to discuss those matters relating to the political 
process. This includes discussion of all elected o a c i h .  The press was designated to serve as a 
"powerful antidote" to any abuses of government. Essentially, disseminating information about 
candidates and elected o5ciak is an integral factor in a democratic society. Id. a t  219. 
124. Id. a t  220. 
125. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Red Lion decision consolidated two conflicting cases from 
the federal courts of appeals. In Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 
F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), the Seventh Circuit held the FCC's "political editorial" and "per- 
sonal attack" rules violated broadcasters' first amendment rights of free speech and commen- 
tary. Id. at 1020. In contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Red Lion, 381 F.2d 
908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), upheld the order requiring licensees to offer airtime to individuals person- 
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Court upheld the Federal Communication Commission's right to im- 
pose the fairness doctrine on the broadcasting media.12e Under the 
fairness doctrine, broadcast stations must give equal time to editorial 
r e~1 ie s . l~~  Recognizing television as the most optimum method for 
disseminating information. to the greatest number of people, the 
Court mandated adoption of the doctrine under first amendment 
prin~ip1es.l~~ In effect, the Court found the public's right to receive 
information outweighed the broadcasters right to stress selective 
 viewpoint^.'^^ 
The Red Lion decision permitted government infringement upon 
free speech. This particular infringement, however, enhanced the 
public's ability to receive full and accurate information. Red Lion 
viewed television as a limited resource.130 The government imposed 
ally attacked on their television stations under the  public's constitutional right to  receive all 
information. See id. at  930. T h e  Court affirmed Red Lion and reversed RTNDA. 395 U.S. at  
401. For a further discussion o f  Red Lion see generally Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: 
First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 974 (1970); T h e  Supreme 
Court 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 ,  133-47 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Term];  Com- 
ment ,  Red Lion and the Fairness Doctrine: Regulation of Broadcasting "In T h e  Public Inter- 
est", 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 807 (1969). 
126. 395 U.S. at  400-01. In writing the  Constitution, the  framers could not have antici- 
pated the  advent o f  the  electronic broadcast media. Unlike the traditional written press, access 
to the  broadcasting media is very limited. Thus ,  when some individuals gain access t o  this 
resource, others must  be  denied. In response t o  this problem, Congress has created a regulatory 
agency, the Federal Communicationri Commission, aimed at  upholding constitutional principles 
in a limited media. T h e  FCC requires each station t o  have a license prior t o  broadcasting. T h e  
award o f  the  license may be subject t o  reasonable regulations with goals other than the sup- 
pression o f  ideas. Red Lion held this regulation is permissible because the  right o f  listeners and 
viewers is paramount t o  the  rights o f  broadcasters. Id. at  390. See generally J. NOWAK, supra 
note 27, at  894-902; Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 
32 CATH. U.L. REV. 603 (1983); Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regu- 
lation, and the  First Amendment, 3 C O M M E N T  L.J. 577 (1981); Lively & Leahy, Government 
and the Media: Regulating a First Amendment Value System, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 913 (1979). 
127. 395 U.S. at  369-70. See F'ub. L. No. 86-274, 3 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959), amending 47 
U.S.C. 3 315(a) (1958) (codified at  47 U.S.C. 3 315(a) (1982)) ( I f  a licensee permits a candidate 
for public office t o  use a broadcasting station, he must  afford equal opportunity to all other 
candidates for that  office.). T h e  fairness doctrine requires all licensed broadcasters t o  provide 
equal opportunities t o  individuals who have been personally attacked and t o  legally qualified 
candidates for office i f  any one candidate in the race is permitted air t ime t o  present views on 
an issue o f  current importance. See Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of 
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1225 (1970); Zack, FCC and the Fairness Doctrine, 19 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 579 (1970). Cf. generally Meyerson, T h e  First Amendment and the Cable Television 
Operator: A n  Unprotectiue Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 C O M M ~ N T  L.J. 1 
(1981) ( the  fairness doctrine does not extend t o  cable television). 
128. See 395 U.S. at  400-01. 
129. See id. at  390. 
130. Id. at  376. T h e  Court espoused the views o f  Congressman Whi te ,  sponsor o f  the Ra- 
dio Act o f  1927. T h e  Radio Act was the  first piece o f  legislation regulating broadcast frequency. 
Congressman Whi te  asserted that  " '[ i l f  enacted into law, the  broadcasting privilege will not be 
a right o f  selfishness. I t  will rest upon an assurance o f  public interest t o  be sewed.' " Id. at 376 
n.5. 
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fairness doctrine was apparently considered the only way to guaran- 
tee equal and open access to this resource for the greatest number of 
people.lS1 
C. Constitutionality of Federal Legislation 
Any curtailment of early election predictions would contravene 
the Red Lion Court's mandate of equal access to the media.ls2 As 
distinguished from the fairness doctrine, a government abolition of 
election predictions would stifle rather than promote discussion. 
Under the guise of protecting citizens' rights to a fair and honest 
election, government would be limiting what citizens could see and 
hear. 
Congress has arguably acknowledged the possibility that a federal 
exit poll restriction would unconstitutionally abridge the first amend- 
ment by its reluctance to pass a binding law for bidding exit pol- 
ling.lSs The first amendment cannot be suppressed unless the govern- 
ment can prove a compelling state interest justifies the 
suppression.1s4 While the government has a fundamental interest in 
preserving each citizen's vote,ls6 this interest is probably not compel- 
ling enough to deny the press the constitutional freedom they are 
entitled to enjoy. 
The Supreme Court recently held a state's interest in preserving 
the overall integrity of the electoral process did not justify interfer- 
ence in the protected realm of first amendment rights.lS6 Under such 
a rule, any federal exit poll legislation would seem to be clearly un- 
131. See id. a t  377. "[Tlhe 'public interest requires ample play for the free and fair com- 
petition of opposing views,. . . ."' Id. See also 1968 Term, supra note 125, a t  141 (broadcasters 
should not systematically exclude ideas); Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amend- 
ment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,1647-5G (1967) (discussion of marketplace of ideas theory). 
132. See supm notes 125-31 and accompanying text. See generally 1968 Term, supra 
note 125, a t  138-46; Comment, supra note 125, at 807-21. 
133. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
134. E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). 
135. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972) ("By denying some citizens the right to 
vote, such laws deprive them of a 'fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights.' ") 
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 37 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 
136. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex re1 La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 
125-26 (1981). In La Follette, the Democratic Party challenged the constitutionality of Wiscon- 
sin's open primary election, which entitled citizens to choose their preferred candidate without 
regard to party preference. The law further required that Democratic delegates to the National 
Convention be bound to cast votes in the same allocations as the statewide primary. Conse- 
quently, the National Democratic Party refused to seat the Wisconsin delegates, arguing that 
such a primary did not truly represent those who had openly stated affiliation with the party. 
Id. a t  110-13. The party charged the state regulation impermissibly impaired the Democratic 
Party's freedom of political association protected by the first amendment. Id. at  113. The state 
argued it  had a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, increas- 
ing voter participation in primaries, and preventing the harassment of voters. Id. at  124-25. 
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constitutional. Proponents of federal exit poll restrictions argue such 
legislation is necessary for the fair administration of elections. Advo- 
cates further assert that such a statute is important to the demo- 
cratic process by preserving the incentive to vote for a portion of the 
electorate.lS7 Under recent case law, however, these arguments would 
not pass judicial muster. 'The court will probably choose to favor the 
needs of the electorate a t  large over those of the small fraction of the 
populous affected in order to preserve the level of speech the Consti- 
tution safeguards. 
D. Constitutional Analysis of State Exit Poll Laws 
Determining the constitutionality of exit poll legislation presents 
a clash of fundamental rights. Each right is essential to a democratic 
system and each is constitutionally based. Inherent in our democratic 
system, however, is a jutlicially mandated hierarchy that elevates 
some first amendment interests over others. The varying levels of 
constitutional scrutiny illustrate this hierarchy.lsS 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have adopted a policy of favor- 
ing the federal government's interests where the government seeks to 
preserve the integrity of the electoral process.lse For example, in 
Buckley v. Valeo,140 the Court found the federal government's inter- 
est in administering fair elections sufficiently compelling to inciden- 
tally burden the first amendment.141 The Buckley Court considered 
the constitutionality of limitations on campaign expenditures and 
 contribution^.^^^ In sustaining the disclosure and reporting provisions 
of the Federal Election and Campaign Act,14S the Buckley Court held 
137. See supra note 11. 
138. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 
552, 559 (1982) (first amendment associational rights superceded by congressional interest in 
enacting a statute limiting certain corporate funding); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) 
(government's interest in preventing corrupt campaign contributions in federal elections is par- 
amount to first amendment free speech). 
140. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
141. Id. a t  29. 
142. Id. a t  6-7. The Court upheld the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and 
reporting provisions, and the public financing schemes included in the 1974 amendments to the 
Election Campaign Act of 1974. The Court, however, found limitations on campaign expendi- 
tures by independent individuals, groups or a candidate repugnant to the Constitution. Id. a t  
143. 
143. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codi- 
fied in scattered sections of 2, 18 and 47 U.S.C. (Supp. I1 197211, amended by Pub. L. No. 96- 
187,93 Stat. 1339 (1979) (current version a t  2 U.S.C. $ 3  431-455 (1982)). For an in-depth anal- 
ysis of the constitutional impacts of the Federal Election Campaign Act see Note, The Uncon- 
stitutionality of Limits on Contributions to Independent Expenditure Committees, 35 U. RA. 
L. REV. 316 (1983). 
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the government's duty to prevent corrupt campaign practices justi- 
fied a slight impediment of first amendment rights.144 
In contrast to its support of laws upholding the integrity of the 
electoral process, the Court has invalidated regulations which sup- 
press campaign information. The Brown decision r e a r m e d  the 
Court's position that voters need to hear all electoral information 
even if such information is slightly tainted.146 Even prior to Brown, 
the Mills Court had refused to silence information essential to the 
voters election c h 0 i ~ e . l ~ ~  Mills stated that the government's interest 
in providing sterile conditions on voting day was an inadequate justi- 
fication for the suppression of speech.14' Under this rationale, news- 
papers have published public opinion polls through the day of an 
election. Arguably, exit polls are merely public opinion polls.14s Thus, 
the policy of prohibiting government regulations which silence infor- 
mation pertinent to voter choice should apply. 
E. Proposed Resolution of the Munro-Heinrich Disparity 
Conceivably, a court may consider both the Heinrich and Munro 
decisions in determining the constitutionality of exit poll legislation. 
The approaches taken in the two decisions pose alternative methods 
for deciding the exit poll dispute. An analysis of both Heinrich and 
Munro in the context of past Supreme Court decisions, however, 
reveals the appropriate constitutional resolution for exit poll 
regulation. 
1. Analysis of the Munro Approach 
Since its earliest decisions concerning the first amendment, the 
Supreme Court has occasionally permitted the state to curtail speech 
when necessary to advance a significant government interest.14s A 
government regulation aimed at  accomplishing a compelling purpose 
is constitutionally permissible if it  is a reasonable regulation affecting 
144. 424 U.S. a t  27-29. 
145. 456 U.S. a t  61. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
146. 384 U.S. a t  219. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
147. 384 U.S. a t  219-20. 
148. Citizens arguably have a constitutional right to predicate their votes on electoral 
returns if that information is ascertainable. Thus, just as many citizens consider public opinion 
polls in their electoral decisions, individuals should be allowed to consider exit poll results. 
149. See, e.g., Hefion v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 
(1981) (state's interest in maintaining order a t  a fairground justified a place restriction on 
speech); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (states may forbid solicitation by 
attorneys for pecuniary gain to protect its citizens from adverse consequences); Friedman v. 
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state's interest in protecting citizens from potentially misleading 
advertising justified a ban on the use of trade names by optometrists). 
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only the time, place, or manner of speech.160 Under the content-neu- 
tral analysis of a time, place and manner restriction, the court fo- 
cuses on the conduct of the speaker rather than the speech itself. 
Taking this approach, the Munro court held that prohibiting poll- 
sters from approaching within 300 feet of a polling site was a reason- 
able restriction on the place of the pollster.161 
In contrast to the Munro judgment, the Heinrich court, in a brief 
discussion of the time, place, and manner restrictions created by the 
exit poll law, criticized the use of a content-neutral analysis.162 Testi- 
mony at the Heinrich trial indicated that at least two centers for po- 
litical discussion were within 300 feet of polling places. Under the 
exit poll statute, a person soliciting signatures on election day at one 
of these sites could be charged with a mi~demeanor.'~~ The Heinrich 
court found the state collld not produce evidence to justify this re- 
~tr ic t i0n. l~~ In comparison, Munro cited no evidence in support of its 
holding validating a simi:lar statute.166 
Interestingly, Munro was decided in Washington, one of three 
states most effected by the polling technique.166 The exit poll contro- 
versy arose out of concern for west coast voters. Conceivably, the 
150. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 
2118, 2130 (1984). In Vincent, a recent decision concerning electoral speech, the Court upheld a 
city ordinance restricting the posting of signs on public property. Id. at 2135-36. A local candi- 
date who campaigned chiefly by posting signs around town challenged the statute as an uncon- 
stitutional abridgement of free speech. Id. a t  2122. The Vincent Court rejected the petitioners' 
argument. The Court recognized the ordinance did place a slight burden on free speech. Id. a t  
2128. The candidate's right to post signs, however, was considered subordinate to the City's 
esthetic and economic interests. Id. a t  2130, 2135-36. The Los Angeles ordinance merely re- 
stricted the manner by which the candidate could campaign and, therefore, was valid as a rea- 
sonable time, place, or manner restriction on speech. See id. a t  2134. 
151. See Munro, No. C83-840T a t  2. 
152. Cf. 590 F. Supp. a t  930. 
153. Id. The Jewish Towers and the Sheet Metal Workers Union hall were within 300 feet 
of a Tampa polling site. Both buildings were centers for political discussion where the solicita- 
tion of signatures was likely to occiu. Under the statute, an individual solicitating signatures in 
one of these buildings on election day could be charged with a misdemeanor. Id. 
154. Id. The only evidence the state presented to demonstrate its compelling need to pre- 
serve the statute was one witness who testified that an "otherwise inoffensive young man" 
made a coy comment following the witness' refusal to sign the petition and that two out of the 
124 precinct captains claimed some dissatisfaction with the order of the elections. The state 
further argued that the statute war1 needed because the deputies charged with maintaining or- 
der a t  the elections received only twenty minutes of instruction and thus might be unprepared 
to handle possible disruption. Id. 
155. See No. (283-840T a t  2. 
156. Early election predictioris most effect Washington, Oregon, and California because 
their polls close three hours later than those in east coast states. The government officials 
championing this legislative reform are primarily from the western states. These individuals are 
protecting both their constituents and perhaps themselves because decreased voter turnouts 
may negatively affect their own elections. See supra note 3. See generally Hearings, supra note 
2; Election Hearings, supra note 4. 
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judge took a paternalistic attitude in deciding this issue. The declara- 
tory judgment and order was a brief synopsis citing no legal prece- 
dent. The court recognized, however, the possibility that first amend- 
ment infringements could result from its order upholding a 300 foot 
ban on exit polling as a reasonable "place" restriction.lK7 
Courts often promote government interests through the guise of 
time, place or manner  restriction^.^^^ For example, in International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves,'K9 the Fifth Circuit up- 
held as a valid place restriction a state statute prohibiting religious 
speech in an airport except at  designated places. The designated 
places, however, were small booths located in isolated areas of the 
airport.leO This effectively prohibited the speakers from having any 
type of effective voice. Nevertheless, the court held that the govern- 
ment had a compelling interest in regulating activities at  the airport 
and that the statute only incidentally burdened free speech.lsl 
As in the Eaves case, requiring pollsters to stand 300 feet from an 
election booth undercuts the effectiveness of their speech. From a 
distance of 300 feet, pollsters can only obtain a sparse sampling of 
the voting public, thereby rendering accurate exit poll predictions 
impossible. Consequently, newscasters would be unable to broadcast 
accurate results even though the Court has recognized the right to 
broadcast news as constitutionally protected. Upholding the validity 
of a polling restriction would terminate the first amendment protec- 
tion of exit polling and would effectively achieve the purpose of a 
unilateral exit poll ban.ls2 
157. No. C83-840T at  1. 
158. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 
S. Ct. 2118 (1984). In Vincent, the Court held an ordinance prohibiting a candidate from post- 
ing campaign signs still left ample alternatives for communications with the electorate. Id. at  
2133. The Vincent Court specifically suggested the use of alternate means of communication. 
Id. The "reasonable alternatives" left by the statute, however, are rather irrational. "The aver- 
age cost of communicating by handbill is . . . likely to be far higher than the average cost of 
communicating by poster." Id. at  2137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Under Vincent, candidates may turn the media to communicate their messages. The 
media, however, is a much more costly alternative than posting signs around town. An individ- 
ual with sparse resources may be unable to run a successful campaign. The statute's seemingly 
"reasonable alternatives" are essentially violative of an open candidacy system. 
159. 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979). See ako HeEron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Con- 
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). A state regulation restricting religious solicitation by Hari 
Kriishna followers relegated the group to a small booth on a Minnesota fairground. Id. at  644. 
The statute effectively silenced the religious group's voice because in order for an individual to 
hear what the followers had to say, the individual had to choose to approach the religious 
group. This effectively mooted the Krishna's speech, because most individuals were hesitant to 
approach the group. 
160. 601 F.2d at  826-30. 
161. Id. at  830. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 10. 
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Time, place, or manner restrictions are constitutionally permissi- 
ble because they are less likely to distort public debate.ls3 Theoreti- 
cally, under a time, place, or manner restriction, the information the 
restriction affects is ultimately disseminated. In practice, however, 
content-neutral restrictions may impair the communication of some 
messages more than others.ls4 For example, the Florida anti-solicita- 
tion statute may have a greater impact on the news media than on a 
group seeking signatures to get a referendum on the ballot because 
the latter could use other means to accomplish their goals.1s6 Regard- 
less of its label as content-neutral, the ultimate result of any exit poll 
regulation would necessarily be a silencing of newscasters on election 
night. 
2. Analysis of the Heinrich Approach 
Entrusting government with the power to control the media cre- 
ates the danger of potential content manipulation by regulatory au- 
thorities. The Supreme Court has, therefore, consistently prohibited 
government restrictions which are solely based on fears of how people 
may react to specific The first amendment presup- 
poses people will act in their own best interest if information is read- 
ily available.ls7 For this reason, regulations directed a t  specific types 
of speech are placed under a more exacting scrutiny than a mere bal- 
ancing test. 
Legislation limiting certain types of communications distorts pub- 
lic debate. These regulations are the antithesis of a citizen's right to 
163. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wnr. & MARY L. REV. 
189, 199-200 (1983) (discussion o f  the rationale behind the content-basedlcontent-neutral 
distinction). 
164. Id. See generally Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Pecu- 
liar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 100-07 (1978) (discussion o f  the 
societal effects o f  content regulation). 
165. For example, individuals interested in obtaining signatures for a referendum would 
probably encounter a substantial part o f  the community at local supermarkets, churches, or 
shopping malls. 
166. See, e.g., Police Dep't o f  Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, 
the First Amendment means that government has no power t o  restrict expression because o f  its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 
(1971) ("[g]overnmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content o f  individual expres- 
sion"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[Dlebate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 
(1963) ("[Tlhe Constitution protects expression . . . without regard to  . . . the truth, popular- 
ity, or social utility o f  the ideas."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962) ("Men are enti- 
tled to  speak as they please on matters vital to  t h e m .  . . [they may not be subject to] punish- 
ment for contempt for the expression."). See generally Stone, supra note 163, at 212-13 
(discussion o f  content-control and the Supreme Court). 
167. Cf. Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1854 (1983). 
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receive information free from government censorship. The Supreme 
Court has, therefore, consistently invalidated statutes targeting a cer- 
tain area of speech.lss For example, a city ordinance which was spe- 
cifically targeted a t  real estate companies and prohibited the posting 
of "for sale" or "sold" signs was held unconsti tuti~nal.~~~ Similarly, a , 
city ordinance prohibiting all picketing except peaceful labor picket- 
ing was also invalidated.170 State exit polling laws selectively prohibit 
a specific form of s~licitation.'~~ The Heinrich court correctly identi- 
fied this infirmity and invalidated the law as an unconstitutional bur- 
den on a targeted area of speech.172 
In its well reasoned opinion, the Heinrich court identified orderly 
elections as the goal of Florida's exit poll legislation. Rejecting the 
statute's infringement on first amendment rights, the court gave ex- 
amples of alternative methods of obtaining this goal which would not 
infringe on protected speech.173 Under the Heinrich analysis, govern- 
ment cannot infringe upon the first amendment rights of the general 
public in order to preserve the voting incentive of a few.17* 
An appropriate constitutional analysis of exit poll legislation 
should rest upon the principals espoused in Heinrich. State attempts 
to limit election predictions curtail a specific speech interest. For the 
Court to uphold this legislation, the government's interest in ad- 
ministering elections free of exit polls must be substantial enough to 
pass a strict scrutiny test. In the case of exit poll restrictions, how- 
ever, the government's interest in protecting a small pool of votes 
does not justify the suppression of first amendment rights. Any state 
legislation aimed at  curtailing exit polling or early election returns 
should be declared unconstitutional. 
168. J. NOWAK, supra note 27, a t  977-88. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (zoning ordinance distinguishing commercial and noncommercial advertis- 
ing was invalidated as an unconstitutional content regulation); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 
(1980) (state statute prohibiting all picketing of residences except for peaceful labor picketing 
of an employer involved in a labor dispute invalidated); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92 (1972) (city ordinance which prohibited all picketing in front of schools except peaceful 
labor picketing held invalid as a content-based regulation). 
169. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Wingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). See generally 
Comment, The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting "For Sale," "Sold," or 
"Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 686 (1970). 
170. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
171. FLA. STAT. 3 104.36 (1983) prohibits the distribution of political and election mate- 
rial, but not any other types of information. 
172. See 590 F. Supp. at 930. 
173. Id. at  930-31. 
174. See id. The court demonstrated its unwillingness to compromise first amendment 
rights of an entire jurisdiction because a few citizens were inconvenienced. On a national level, 
this theory suggests that United States citizens' first amendment rights of free speech and right 
to receive information should not be sacrificed at the expense of a small fraction of the 
population. 
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F. Congressional Legislation as a Prior Restraint of Speech 
In addition to viewing a restraint on early elections as an uncon- 
stitutional content-based regulation, the Court may also perceive it 
as a prior restraint.176 Under the doctrine of prior restraint, the gov- 
ernment cannot restrict speech prior to an adequate judicial determi- 
nation that the first amendment does not protect the expression.176 
Although the first amendment is not an absolute bar to prior re- 
straints, any system of prior restraints is presumptively unconstitu- 
ti011al.l~~ Moreover, even in cases where the presumption is rebutted, 
the Court has insisted upon procedural safeguards designed to insure 
as full a presentation of the matter as the circumstances permit.178 In 
short, the Court allows prior restraints only in exceptional cases.170 
The Court has invoked the prior restraint doctrine to invalidate most 
regulatory schemes of government censorship.180 The Supreme Court, 
however, has been reluctant to rule on cases where its decision ulti- 
mately effects electoral ~ u t c o r n e s . ~ ~ ~  Conceivably, the Court could 
choose to abstain from deciding the question at all. This, however, is 
highly unlikely. 
A primary concern in prior restraint cases has been that any re- 
straint, however temporary, allows the government to destroy the im- 
mediacy of the intended speech.lS2 This often deprives the speech of 
175. See generally Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions 
of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 COR- 
NELL L. REV. 245 (1982) (prior restraint doctrjnes are a necessary mandate under a democratic 
system); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. ROBS. 648 (1955) 
(thorough analysis of the prior restraint doctrine). 
176. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). In Near, the Court firmly adopted 
the doctrine of prior restraint. The Court presumed the chief purpose of freedom of the press 
was to prevent all prior restraints of speech. Thus, the Near Court held that many schemes 
constituting a prior restraint of speech are invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments. 
Id. a t  716. See Emerson, supra note 175, at  648; J. NOWAK, supra note 27, a t  890-92. 
177. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
178. J. NOWAK, supra note 27, at  890-92. 
179. 283 U.S. a t  716. The Court listed three exceptions to the general rule that prior 
restraints are forbidden: (1) publications obstructing the government's recruiting services, or 
publications concerning sailing dates or the number and location of troops, (2) publications 
containing obscenity, (3) publications inciting "acts of violence and the overthrow . . . of or- 
derly government." Id. 
180. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, a t  724. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (plays); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Penta- 
gon papers); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (parade permit); Freed- 
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (films); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 
205 (1964) (books). 
181. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (Court unwilling to decide whether 
California delegates were unconstitutionally denied a seat at  the convention because such a 
decision would ultimately effect the outcome of the presidential election). 
182. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968). 
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its persuasiveness and, in some cases, is tantamount to permanently 
preventing its dissemination. In Carroll v. President & Commission- 
ers of Princess Anne,'8s the Court recognized that the element of 
timeliness can be essential in the speech process. Even a fractional 
delay in transmitting information to the public may be of critical im- 
portance.lS4 In Carroll, the respondents held a racist rally, and 
planned to continue the rally on the following day. Local officials, 
however, intervened with a temporary injunction.lS6 Rejecting the pe- 
titioner's argument that the injunction was merely an intervention in 
events which had already commenced, the Court held that the in- 
junction was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Carroll held that the 
immediate dissemination of the facts on important issues was crucial 
to the operation of a democracy.1ss 
The injunction in Carroll is strikingly similar to governmental at- 
tempts to eliminate exit polling and early election predictions. Argua- 
bly, however, any present government intervention in the media's 
election broadcasts would not constitute a prior restraint. The judici- 
ary might analyze legislation in the context of the 1980 election expe- 
rience. This is a tenuous approach, however, because candidates and 
voter behavior differ substantially from year to year. Following the 
principals espoused in Carroll, any present congressional intervention 
in election night broadcasts would be an interference prior to an ade- 
quate judicial determination of the legislation's constitutional 
impact. 
Of the various types of prior restraints, a system making speech 
or publication dependent on the prior permission of government offi- 
cials is the most objectionable. Under such a system, the suppression 
of speech is accomplished by a "single stroke of the pen."lS7 Congres- 
sional action at  this time would, ostensibly, create this forbidden sys- 
tem. Not only would an enactment of federal legislation be a prior 
restraint of speech, it  would also undermine traditional constitutional 
principles in a most violative way. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution's framers took steps to insure each individual an 
equal access to all available information. While the government's pa- 
183. 393 U.S. 175 (1968). 
184. Id. at 182 (quoting A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 
(1964)). 
185. Id. at 177. 
186. Id. at 182 (quoting A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 
(1964)). 
187. Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409,425 (1983). 
Heinonline - -  36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 519 1984 
520 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI 
ternalistic restrictions are laudable for attempting to ensure all votes 
receive equal weight, they are contrary to the democratic idea of free- 
dom of information. Absent a threat to national security, allowing the 
government to regulate speech is a frightening proposition. If the 
Congress passes legislation regulating early election predictions, the 
danger exists of this restriction escalating into a much more dubious 
exercise of government control. Restrictions of east coast presidential 
electoral returns might u'ltimately result in a ban on the broadcast of 
primary results until the last primaries have been held. Conceivably, 
this limited regulatory scheme could approach total electoral 
censorship. 
Concededly, the broadcast of early election returns is not desira- 
ble. I t  hampers the voice of a t  least a small group of voters. Allowing 
restrictions of election returns, however, whatever their form, would 
give Congress leverage tcl eventually enact even more stringent elec- 
tion speech regulations. Elecause of this threat, the only realistic solu- 
tion to the exit polling conflict is for the small fraction of voters af- 
fected to defer to the good of the electorate a t  large. The Court in 
deciding this issue must recognize that upholding any such legislation 
may have the effect of encouraging future government censorship. 
Congressional attempts to enact election broadcast legislation create 
an unacceptable risk of suppression of information. 
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